Game Theory Strategic Decision Making and Behavioral Economics

Chapter 11

Game Theory, Strategic Decision Making, and Behavioral Economics

True / False Questions

1. Game theory tells how to win at games of chance.
True False

2. Strategic reasoning applies to situations where decisions are interdependent.
True False

3. Game theory suggests that when we act in our own immediate best interest, this leads to the best of all possible outcomes.
True False

4. Game theory replaces the standard supply and demand model used by economists.
True False

5. The prisoner's dilemma is a theoretical tool with little in the way of practical applications.
True False

6. The prisoner's dilemma provides an explanation of why detectives interview suspects separately in television crime shows.
True False

7. The payoff matrix shows the outcome for only one player in a game situation.
True False

8. The Code of Silence attributed to the Mafia is one way to avoid the prisoner's dilemma.
True False

9. In experiments testing game theory, cheap talk does not affect the outcome of a game.
True False

10. A dominant strategy means that one player will always win the game.
True False

11. Loss aversion means that people are made worse off by losses.
True False

12. "Framing effects" suggests that the wording of questions affects people's survey responses.
True False

13. When some people do not act rationally, others can profit from that irrationality.
True False

14. "Leaving money on the table" refers to the potential gains to be made when people act irrationally.
True False

Multiple Choice Questions

15. Formal economic reasoning applied to situations in which decisions are interdependent is called:
A. economic decision making.
B. monopolistic decision making.
C. competitive decision making.
D. game theory.

16. Game theory is designed to study situations where each agent's decisions are:
A. interdependent.
B. independent.
C. constrained.
D. uninformed.

17. Game theory:
A. is more restrictive than the standard supply/demand model.
B. is more flexible than the standard supply/demand model.
C. replaces the standard supply/demand model.
D. replaces the monopoly model.

18. Game theory:
A. is the best model for perfect competition.
B. replaces the standard supply/demand model.
C. is the best model for monopoly.
D. complements the standard supply/demand model.

19. The formal game theory model assumes that:
A. markets are contestable when no barriers to entry exists.
B. the dominant firm in the industry will set product price and other firms will follow.
C. each player tries to anticipate the reaction of its rivals when making a decision.
D. each player ignores the possible reaction of its rivals when making a decision.

20. Taking explicit account of a rival's expected response to a decision you are making is called:
A. economic decision making.
B. monopolistic decision making.
C. strategic decision making.
D. competitive decision making.

21. A screening question is structured:
A. to screen unqualified applicants for a job.
B. to extract information from prisoners.
C. to alter respondent's behavior.
D. to reveal strategic information about the person who answers.

22. The prisoner's dilemma is a well-known game in which:
A. cooperation is always the best independent action.
B. independent action is not necessarily the best joint action, but is the best independent action.
C. players always cheat.
D. players never cheat.

23. The prisoner's dilemma is an example of:
A. a non-cooperative game.
B. a cooperative game.
C. a non-strategic game.
D. a sequential game.

24. The values in a payoff matrix show:
A. the gains and losses of decisions for each player regardless of decisions of other players.
B. the best possible outcomes of various players in a game.
C. the gains and losses of decisions for each player given the decisions of other players.
D. the worst possible outcomes of various players in a game.

25. The matrix below represents a payoff matrix for a:
A. zero sum game.
B. non-zero sum game.
C. repeated game.
D. sequential game.

26. The matrix below represents a payoff matrix for a:

A. zero sum game.
B. non-zero sum game.
C. repeated game.
D. sequential game.

27. The equilibrium solution for the payoff matrix below is:
A. 1, 1
B. 2, 0
C. 0, 2
D. -1, -1

28. The equilibrium solution for the payoff matrix below is:
A. -1, -1
B. 5, 0
C. 2, 2
D. 10, 1

29. Consider the payoff matrix below facing two criminals.
Their options are either to confess or not to confess. The payoffs represent the number of years each will spend in jail. The Nash equilibrium for the above payoff matrix is:
A. A: 20 yrs, B: 20 yrs
B. A: 50 yrs, B: 2 yrs
C. A: 2 yrs, B: 50 yrs
D. A: 10 yrs, B: 10 yrs

30. If individuals can credibly cooperate and split the gains, which payoff is the most likely?
A. 1, 50
B. 1, 1
C. 2, 1
D. 5. 5

31. The National Hockey League locked out the hockey players in an effort to negotiate a salary cap with the players' union. A cap would limit the payroll of each team. League officials acknowledged that the teams have brought the problem on themselves by overspending and overpaying some players in an effort to compete for the best players. Why would the teams have caused this problem for themselves?
A. They used explicit collusion instead of implicit collusion.
B. They tried to create a contestable market and now suffer because there are no barriers to entry.
C. They were caught in the logic of the prisoner's dilemma in which each player maximizing his own self-interest leads to an outcome that is worse off for everyone.
D. They tried to create a cartel and suffered the consequences of too much collusion.

32. Don and Dana have both been accused of insider trading. Don knows that if he confesses while Dana keeps silent, he will receive a one-month jail sentence. He also knows that if Dana confesses and he keeps silent, he will receive a twelve month jail sentence. If neither of them confesses, there will be insufficient evidence to convict either of insider trading, but there is enough evidence to convict each of them individually of obstructing justice, which carries a 2-month sentence. If both of them confess, they will both serve a three-month jail sentence. This situation is:
A. an example of cartel behavior.
B. an application of the prisoner's dilemma.
C. not realistic because those accused of insider trading always keep silent.
D. not realistic because those accused of insider trading are never encouraged to confess.

33. Don and Dana have both been accused of insider trading. Don knows that if he confesses while Dana keeps silent, he will receive a one-month jail sentence. He also knows that if Dana confesses and he keeps silent, he will receive a twelve month jail sentence. If neither of them confesses, there will be insufficient evidence to convict either and they will serve no time. If both of them confess, they will both serve a three-month jail sentence. Don's best strategy is to:
A. confess in order to avoid the possibility of a one-year jail sentence.
B. confess because then he will not have to serve a jail sentence.
C. not confess because keeping silent ensures that they will not have to serve jail sentences.
D. not confess because doing so guarantees a jail sentence.

34. TV crime shows illustrate the prisoner's dilemma when:
A. the judge ponders the sentence for the crimes.
B. the prisoners go to prison for the first time.
C. the police interview suspects in the same room.
D. the police interview suspects in different rooms.

35. When suspects are interviewed in different rooms they do not know what the other suspects are going to do and hence seek the best deal for themselves. This illustrates:
A. that criminals are irrational.
B. the idea of a cooperative game.
C. the idea of a non-cooperative game.
D. that the police are not taking into account the suspects' rights.

36. In standard game theory, cheap talk:
A. will fool all players into cooperating.
B. doesn't affect the outcome of the game.
C. benefits only trustworthy people.
D. changes the pay-offs.

37. What is true about the payoff matrix below?
A. Players cannot jointly do better by cooperating.
B. Players cannot escape the 0-0 payoff.
C. Player A is better off lying that he will choose column 1 and then choosing column 2.
D. Player B is better off lying that he will choose row 1 and then choosing row 2.

38. What is true about the payoff matrix below?
A. Only player A has a dominant strategy.
B. Only player B has a dominant strategy.
C. Both players A and B have dominant strategies.
D. Neither player A nor B has a dominant strategy.

39. What is true about the payoff matrix below?
A. Only player A has a dominant strategy.
B. Only player B has a dominant strategy.
C. Both player A and B have dominant strategies.
D. Neither player A nor B has a dominant strategy.

40. A strategy that is preferred by an individual regardless of an opponent's decision is called:
A. a Nash equilibrium.
B. a Vickery position.
C. a framing strategy.
D. a dominant strategy.

41. A set of strategies in which no player can improve his or her payoff by changing his own action is called:
A. a Nash equilibrium.
B. a Vickery position.
C. a framing strategy.
D. a dominant strategy.

42. A Nash equilibrium is:
A. the payoff that maximizes joint payoff.
B. the output level that minimizes average total cost.
C. the strategy that maximizes the outcome of all the players.
D. the set of strategies such that no player can improve their position by changing his own action.

43. A Nash equilibrium assumes that a player follows his best strategy:
A. given that the other players follow a random strategy.
B. given that the other players follow their worst strategy.
C. given that the other players follow their best strategy.
D. regardless of what other players do.

44. A Nash equilibrium refers to a:
A. cooperative game.
B. a sequential game.
C. a repeated game.
D. a non-cooperative game.

45. The Nash equilibrium in the payoff matrix below is:
A. -1, -1.
B. -1, 1.
C. 1, -1.
D. there is no Nash equilibrium.

46. Consider the payoff matrix below facing two criminals.
Their options are either to confess or not to confess. Given this information:
A. A has a dominant strategy but B does not.
B. B has a dominant strategy but A does not.
C. Both A and B have dominant strategies.
D. Neither A nor B have dominant strategies.

47. Consider the payoff matrix below facing two firms selling the same product in the same market. They must choose whether to price the good at a high or low price.
Given this information:
A. A has a dominant strategy but B does not.
B. B has a dominant strategy but A does not.
C. Both A and B have dominant strategies.
D. Neither A nor B have dominant strategies.

Consider the payoff matrix below facing Harry and Sally when each chooses to go to the coffee shop listed. Harry wants to avoid Sally at the coffee shop and is not happy when Sally ends up in the same shop he chooses. Sally would like to see Harry, so she is not happy when Harry ends up in a different coffee shop from her.

48. Given this payoff:
A. A has a dominant strategy but B does not.
B. B has a dominant strategy but A does not.
C. Both A and B have dominant strategies.
D. Neither A nor B has a dominant strategy.

49. Assuming that Sally and Harry go to the coffee shop each day, what is Harry's best strategy?
A. Go to Starbucks because Sally won't go there.
B. Go to Dunkin Donuts because Sally won't go there.
C. Go to Starbucks one day and Dunkin Donuts the next, and maintain that pattern.
D. Randomly choose between going to Starbucks and Dunkin Donuts.

Consider the payoff matrix below facing Harry and Sally when each chooses to go to the coffee shop listed. Both Harry and Sally would like to meet each other but are shy about asking one another out on a date.

50. What is Harry's best strategy?
A. Harry has no best strategy.
B. Go to Dunkin Donuts.
C. Go to Starbucks.
D. Stay at home.

51. If Harry and Sally go to the coffee shop every day, what is Harry's best strategy?
A. Harry has no best strategy.
B. Choose one shop to go to and keep going to it.
C. Randomly choose between the two shops and hope Sally will end up there too.
D. Stay at home.

52. The potential for return to cooperation is greatest in:
A. zero sum games.
B. repeated games.
C. sequential games.
D. simultaneous move games.

53. A sequential game is one where:
A. players act together to achieve a common goal.
B. players take turns making moves/decisions.
C. players make their moves/decision at the same time.
D. there is never a winner if players act rationally.

54. A simultaneous game is one where:
A. players act together to achieve a common goal.
B. players take turns making moves/decisions.
C. players make their moves/decisions at the same time.
D. there is never a winner if players act rationally.

55. In a sequential game:
A. the first player always has the advantage.
B. the second player always has the advantage.
C. neither player ever has any advantage.
D. either player could have the advantage depending on the game.

56. Which of the following games has a first-mover advantage?
A. Tic tac toe.
B. Prisoner's dilemma.
C. Rock, paper, scissors.
D. Vickrey auction.

57. The best strategy for each player if this game is repeated is:
A. his or her dominant strategy.
B. a mixed strategy.
C. to cheat.
D. to collaborate.

58. A mixed strategy is most useful:
A. in sequential games.
B. in simultaneous games.
C. in both sequential and simultaneous games.
D. only when the outcome is random.

59. In a mixed strategy:
A. the payoffs are mixed during each round.
B. the order of who chooses first is mixed.
C. moves can be predicted.
D. players try to avoid demonstrating a pattern.

60. A mixed strategy means a player:
A. makes random moves in a sequential game.
B. makes random moves in a simultaneous game.
C. mixes random moves with nonrandom moves.
D. mixes optimal and suboptimal moves to confuse her opponent.

61. Backward induction means a player:
A. studies his opponent's moves to figure out what he did wrong.
B. studies what other players have done in similar situations.
C. studies the rules of the game to determine how to make her next move.
D. works from the desired outcome to determine the decisions that lead to that outcome.

62. Backward induction will not lead to a determinate sequence of actions for:
A. games with dominant strategies.
B. sequential games.
C. simultaneous move games.
D. mixed strategy games.

63. Optimal rollback strategies are most difficult in:
A. sequential games.
B. simultaneous games.
C. zero-sum games.
D. repeated games.

64. In the 2/3s game, in which you are to choose a number between 1 and 100 which is 2/3^rds of the average chosen by the group, the rollback strategy is to:
A. choose a number randomly.
B. be the last person to choose a number.
C. be the first person to choose a number.
D. choose zero.

65. The rationality assumptions of game theory:
A. always hold in the real world.
B. never hold in the real world.
C. sometimes hold in the real world.
D. make game theory irrelevant.

66. Most games in real life:
A. require intuition, common sense and calculations.
B. require a mixed strategy.
C. require a rollback strategy.
D. have a best solution.

67. A Nash equilibrium:
A. always exists.
B. is always reached in game playing.
C. may sometimes not be reached because people assume others react rationally.
D. may sometimes not be reached because people do not assume that others act rationally.

68. Informal game theory:
A. relies on deductive logic.
B. shows how the Nash equilibrium is reached.
C. assumes people calculate their optimal strategy.
D. considers how people actually think and behave.

69. In a standard sealed bid auction, the person who bids:
A. the highest gets the object of the bid.
B. the second highest gets the good and pays that price.
C. the second highest has the option to receive the good if she pays the price of the highest bidder.
D. the highest gets the object but pays the price bid by the second highest bidder.

70. In a sealed bid Vickery auction, the person who bids:
A. the highest gets the object of the bid at the price he or she bid.
B. the second highest bidder gets the good and pays that price.
C. the second highest bidder has the option to receive the good if he or she pays the price of the highest bidder.
D. the highest bidder gets the object but pays the price bid by the second highest bidder.

71. In a standard highest sealed bid auction, a bidder's best strategy:
A. is to bid what he would be willing to pay.
B. is to bid slightly more than what he or she expects the second highest bidder to bid.
C. always ensures that the person who wants it the most will get the bid.
D. requires the bidder to understand game theory to bid properly.

72. In a Vickrey auction, a bidder's strategy:
A. is to bid what he would be willing to pay.
B. is to bid just slightly more than the next bidder.
C. is to bid just below the next highest bidder.
D. requires the bidder to understand game theory to bid properly.

73. Behavioral economics helps explain:
A. why people are rational.
B. why people are selfish.
C. why being selfish is rational.
D. the degree to which people are altruistic.

74. Assuming the standard assumptions, in a repeated play ultimatum game, the first player's best strategy in the last round is to:
A. split the money evenly with a bit more going to yourself.
B. give the most money to the opponent.
C. give the most money to yourself.
D. take all the money for yourself.

75. Assuming the standard assumptions, in a single play ultimatum game, the second player's best strategy in the last round is to:
A. reject all but evenly split offers.
B. accept any offer greater than zero.
C. accept only those offers over 50 percent of the total.
D. reject all offers.

76. Assuming the standard assumptions, in an infinitely long repeated play ultimatum game, the second player's best strategy is most likely to:
A. reject offers that appear unfair.
B. accept any offer.
C. accept only those offers over 50 percent of the total.
D. reject all offers.

77. If people are given one of two items of the same value and are given the choice to exchange it:
A. about fifty percent will make the change since half will prefer the other item.
B. everyone will keep the first item since it was free.
C. everyone will trade since people like to trade.
D. most will keep the original item since they are averse to losing what they have.

78. Loss aversion in behavioral economics refers to how people are averse to:
A. losses in a game of chance such as poker.
B. stock market losses.
C. losing something a person already has.
D. the loss of something of high value.

79. If two choices are the same but one is presented in a positive manner and one in a negative context, people:
A. are rational and respond the same.
B. respond the same because of loss aversion.
C. respond differently because of loss aversion.
D. respond differently because of the framing effects.

80. The fact that airlines offer off-peak airline discounts rather than peak-time surcharges is an example of:
A. loss aversion.
B. framing effects.
C. non-zero sum game.
D. irrational behavior.

81. Why might the economy as a whole conform to the predictions of a model even if not all people are rational?
A. The standard model doesn't assume rationality.
B. Those people who are rational will profit from those who are not.
C. Those people who are irrational will profit from those who are not.
D. It won't; for the standard model to work, all people must be rational.

Chapter 11 Game Theory, Strategic Decision Making, and Behavioral Economics Answer Key

True / False Questions

1. Game theory tells how to win at games of chance.
FALSE

Game theory is about using reasoning when decisions are interdependent.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-1
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

2. Strategic reasoning applies to situations where decisions are interdependent.
TRUE

This is the definition of strategic reasoning.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Easy
Learning Objective: 11-1
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

3. Game theory suggests that when we act in our own immediate best interest, this leads to the best of all possible outcomes.
FALSE

Game theory suggests exactly the opposite. Cooperation is frequently better than acting in accord with our immediate self-interest.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

4. Game theory replaces the standard supply and demand model used by economists.
FALSE

Game theory complements rather than replaces the standard economic models.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

5. The prisoner's dilemma is a theoretical tool with little in the way of practical applications.
FALSE

The prisoner's dilemma is useful in many real world situations.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Easy
Learning Objective: 11-3
Topic: Prisoner's Dilemma

6. The prisoner's dilemma provides an explanation of why detectives interview suspects separately in television crime shows.
TRUE

By interviewing suspects separately the police can offer a lighter sentence to the one who confesses first, thereby breaking down the cooperation between the suspects.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-3
Topic: Prisoner's Dilemma

7. The payoff matrix shows the outcome for only one player in a game situation.
FALSE

A payoff matrix shows the outcome of each player in the game.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Easy
Learning Objective: 11-4
Topic: Payoff Matrices

8. The Code of Silence attributed to the Mafia is one way to avoid the prisoner's dilemma.
TRUE

The central element of the Code of Silence is to ensure that the suspects know their partners will not confess.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-4
Topic: Prisoner's Dilemma

9. In experiments testing game theory, cheap talk does not affect the outcome of a game.
FALSE

While in standard game theory, cheap talk has no effect, in experiments cheap talk has been shown to be a way to induce individuals to coordinate their actions and establish trust.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Easy
Learning Objective: 11-4
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

10. A dominant strategy means that one player will always win the game.
FALSE

A dominant strategy is simply the best strategy for a player regardless of the opponent's move.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-4
Topic: Dominant and Mixed Strategies

11. Loss aversion means that people are made worse off by losses.
FALSE

Loss aversion means that people value things that they actually possess more than things that they don't.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-5
Topic: Behavioral Economics

12. "Framing effects" suggests that the wording of questions affects people's survey responses.
TRUE

People will respond differently to positively and negatively worded questions.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-5
Topic: Behavioral Economics

13. When some people do not act rationally, others can profit from that irrationality.
TRUE

Irrational behavior means that something was not maximized and the extra amount not obtained by that behavior allows for profit opportunities.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-6
Topic: Behavioral Economics

14. "Leaving money on the table" refers to the potential gains to be made when people act irrationally.
TRUE

When people do not act fully rationally, there are unrealized gains. Those gains are called "money on the table" and may be captured by someone else.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-6
Topic: Behavioral Economics

Multiple Choice Questions

See the definition of game theory in the text.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Easy
Learning Objective: 11-1
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

16. Game theory is designed to study situations where each agent's decisions are:
A. interdependent.
B. independent.
C. constrained.
D. uninformed.

Game theory is best applied to strategic thinking. This is when decisions are interdependent.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-1
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

Game theory examines the assumptions behind the standard supply/demand model, and is therefore more flexible.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-1
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

18. Game theory:
A. is the best model for perfect competition.
B. replaces the standard supply/demand model.
C. is the best model for monopoly.
D. complements the standard supply/demand model.

The reasoning of game theory is consistent with the supply/demand model.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-1
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

The key assumption of game theory is interdependent choices.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Easy
Learning Objective: 11-1
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

See the definition of strategic decision making in the text.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Easy
Learning Objective: 11-1
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

See the definition of a screening question in the text.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-1
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

In the prisoner's dilemma game, cooperation is beneficial for both prisoners, but difficult to achieve. There are gains to both cooperative and independent action. Individuals don't always act in their best joint interest.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Prisoner's Dilemma

23. The prisoner's dilemma is an example of:
A. a non-cooperative game.
B. a cooperative game.
C. a non-strategic game.
D. a sequential game.

The prisoner's dilemma is a game in which each player's dominant strategy leads to a less desirable outcome for both players, than if they had cooperated. It is example of a game where players are unable to cooperate for their self-interest, because they are unable to ensure that the other player will do so, and because each player has an incentive to choose the non-cooperative option (where the prisoner confesses).

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Prisoner's Dilemma

The values in a payoff matrix show both gains and losses of various decisions based on the decisions of all other players in the game.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Payoff Matrices

25. The matrix below represents a payoff matrix for a:
A. zero sum game.
B. non-zero sum game.
C. repeated game.
D. sequential game.

This is a non-zero sum game because the sum of all the squares isn't the same for both participants. It cannot be a repeated or sequential game because the decisions in the prisoner's dilemma are made once and simultaneously.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Synthesis
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Payoff Matrices

26. The matrix below represents a payoff matrix for a:
A. zero sum game.
B. non-zero sum game.
C. repeated game.
D. sequential game.

Because the sum of the values in each square is the same, this is a zero sum game. It cannot be a repeated or sequential game because the decisions in the prisoner's dilemma are made once and simultaneously.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Synthesis
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Payoff Matrices

27. The equilibrium solution for the payoff matrix below is:
A. 1, 1
B. 2, 0
C. 0, 2
D. -1, -1

The equilibrium solution is where each player maximizes the expected payoff. A is best off choosing column 2. So, knowing that A will choose column 2, B will choose row 2.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Synthesis
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Payoff Matrices

28. The equilibrium solution for the payoff matrix below is:
A. -1, -1
B. 5, 0
C. 2, 2
D. 10, 1

The equilibrium solution is where each player maximizes the expected payoff. Regardless of what B chooses, A is better off choosing Column 2. Knowing that, B is best off choosing row 2.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Synthesis
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Payoff Matrices

29. Consider the payoff matrix below facing two criminals.

Their options are either to confess or not to confess. The payoffs represent the number of years each will spend in jail. The Nash equilibrium for the above payoff matrix is:
A. A: 20 yrs, B: 20 yrs
B. A: 50 yrs, B: 2 yrs
C. A: 2 yrs, B: 50 yrs
D. A: 10 yrs, B: 10 yrs

The Nash equilibrium is where each player maximizes the expected payoff. Regardless of what B chooses, A is better off choosing Column 1. Knowing that, B is better off choosing row 1.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Synthesis
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-3
Topic: Nash Equilibrium

30. If individuals can credibly cooperate and split the gains, which payoff is the most likely?
A. 1, 50
B. 1, 1
C. 2, 1
D. 5. 5

The square with the highest joint payoff is the most likely if the players can cooperate, because it has the highest joint payoff which they can then divide between themselves.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Payoff Matrices

The logic of the prisoner's dilemma is what limits cooperation among competitors.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Application
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Prisoner's Dilemma

See the explanation of the prisoner's dilemma.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Application
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Prisoner's Dilemma

Since they each do better by not confessing assuming the other person does not confess, their best strategy is not to confess. Draw the pay-off table to see this clearly.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Application
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Payoff Matrices

When suspects are interviewed in different rooms they do not know what the other suspects are going to do and hence seek the best deal for themselves.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Prisoner's Dilemma

This meets the definition of a non-cooperative game since they do not know the moves of the other person.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Prisoner's Dilemma

36. In standard game theory, cheap talk:
A. will fool all players into cooperating.
B. doesn't affect the outcome of the game.
C. benefits only trustworthy people.
D. changes the pay-offs.

Cheap talk, because it is not enforceable, will not change the outcome of the game in standard game theory because players have no trust in one another.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Strategic Reasoning

Since both players are better off choosing column 1 and row 1 respectively, which has the same joint payoff as the other options, they are not better off cooperating. A is better off saying he will choose column 1 and in fact choosing column 1. B is better off saying he will choose row 1 and in fact choosing row 1.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Payoff Matrices

Since both players are better off choosing column 1 and row 1 respectively regardless of what the other player does, both have dominant strategies.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-4
Topic: Dominant and Mixed Strategies

Player A is better off choosing Column 2 if B chooses row 1 and Column 1 if B chooses row 2. Player B is better off choosing Row 1 regardless of what A does. So, player B has a dominant strategy, but A does not.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Analysis
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-4
Topic: Dominant and Mixed Strategies

40. A strategy that is preferred by an individual regardless of an opponent's decision is called:
A. a Nash equilibrium.
B. a Vickery position.
C. a framing strategy.
D. a dominant strategy.

See the definition of a dominant strategy in the text.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-4
Topic: Dominant and Mixed Strategies

See the definition of a Nash Equilibrium in the text.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-3
Topic: Nash Equilibrium

See the definition of a Nash Equilibrium in the text. A Nash equilibrium refers to the set of strategies by all the players, not just one player's individual strategy.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-3
Topic: Nash Equilibrium

See the definition of a Nash Equilibrium in the text. A Nash equilibrium refers to the set of strategies by all the players, not just one player's individual strategy.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-3
Topic: Nash Equilibrium

44. A Nash equilibrium refers to a:
A. cooperative game.
B. a sequential game.
C. a repeated game.
D. a non-cooperative game.

See the definition of a Nash Equilibrium in the text. A Nash equilibrium refers to a non-cooperative game set of strategies. That is, players are unable to cooperate and attempt to make the best decision for themselves, while considering that the other player follows his or her own best strategy.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Knowledge
Difficulty: Medium
Learning Objective: 11-3
Topic: Nash Equilibrium

45. The Nash equilibrium in the payoff matrix below is:
A. -1, -1.
B. -1, 1.
C. 1, -1.
D. there is no Nash equilibrium.

A Nash equilibrium is a set of strategies for each player in which no player can improve his or her payoff by changing strategy unilaterally. If B chooses row 1, A's best strategy is to choose column 1. But if B chooses row 2, A's best strategy is to choose column 2. If A chooses column 1, B's best strategy is to choose row 2. But if A chooses column 2, B's best strategy is to choose row 1. So, there is no Nash equilibrium. Each can improve his or her payoff by changing strategy unilaterally.

AACSB: Analytic
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Synthesis
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-3
Topic: Nash Equilibrium

Regardless of what B chooses, A is best off choosing Column 1. Regardless of what A chooses, B is best off choosing Row 1. Therefore both have dominant strategies.

AACSB: Reflective Thinking
BLOOM'S TAXONOMY: Synthesis
Difficulty: Hard
Learning Objective: 11-2
Topic: Dominant and Mixed Strategies

Regardless of what A chooses, B is better off choosing Column 1. A is better off choosing Row 1 if B chooses Column 1 but Row 2 if B chooses Column 2. So, B has a dominant strategy while A does not.